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LAND CONTRACTS REVISITED
JAMES E. LEAHY*
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1956, the NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW published an arti-
cle entitled Cancellation of Land Contracts.' The article dis-
cussed cancellation of land contracts by notice as provided in
chapter 32-18, actions to cancel land contracts in the district court,
foreclosure under chapter 32-19, and cancellation by a quiet title
action. The following article updates the law regarding those rem-
edies and adds sections on specific performance and rescission.
II. CHAPTER 32-18-STATUTORY CANCELLATION BY
NOTICE
This chapter provides a method whereby a vendor may cancel
a land contract without intervention of the district court. As the
following discussion will illustrate, this method is not exclusive.2
Even if the contract provides that the vendee will" 'upon demand
... quietly and peaceably surrender to [the vendors] possession of
said premises... ,' ,, the vendor is not restricted to cancellation
by notice.4 The supreme court has said that although a contract
may contain a provision that allows a vendor to cancel it by notice
if a vendee defaults in payments, the vendor is not required to
exercise the option to cancel.5
The statutory requirements for cancellation must be strictly
followed. As the court pointed out in Rohrich v. Kaplan:' "Chap-
ter 32-18 [] [of the North Dakota Century Code] [] sets out a strict
procedure for cancellation of a contract for the future conveyance
of real estate."7
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1. James E. Leahy, Cancellation of Land Contracts, 32 N.D. L. REV. 5 (1956).
2. See Adolph Rub Trust v. Rub, 474 N.W.2d 73, 76 (N.D. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S.Ct.
1276 (1992), reh'g denied, 112 S.Ct. 1713 (1992) (finding that cancellation of contract for
deed under chapter 32-18 is not an exclusive remedy).
3. Schaff v. Kennelly, 61 N.W.2d 538, 550 (N.D. 1953).
4. Id.
5. D.S.B. Johnston Land Co. v. Whipple, 234 N.W. 59 (N.D. 1930).
6. 248 N.W.2d 801 (N.D. 1976).
7. Rohrich v. Kaplan, 248 N.W.2d 801, 805 (N.D. 1976). See also Pyle v. Egeberg, 356
N.W.2d 94, 97 (N.D. 1984).
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
A. SECTION 32-18-01-INSTRUMENTS FOR FUTURE
CONVEYANCE--CANCELLATION-OWNER MUST
GIVE WRITTEN NOTICE TO VENDEE OR
PURCHASER.
A vendor choosing statutory cancellation by notice must give
"written notice to the vendee or purchaser, or his assigns."' Fail-
ure to give notice to an assignee whom the vendor knows exists
will make the cancellation ineffective. As Justice William L. Paul-
son pointed out for the North Dakota Supreme Court: "When the
seller has knowledge or notice that the buyer in a land contract
has assigned his interest therein to some other person, it is incum-
bent upon the seller to serve notice of cancellation upon the
assignee. "
A vendor may lose the right to cancel a land contract under
this chapter if he or she after default acts in a manner inconsistent
with the intent of the statutes. In Sadler v. Ballantyne,10 the ven-
dors notified the vendees of a default in payment of an annual
installment and two years' taxes.1 Before the redemption period
expired, the vendees paid the defaulted payment plus one addi-
tional installment but did not pay the back taxes.12 After the
redemption period expired, the vendors learned that the taxes had
not been paid.' 3 They immediately recorded an affidavit cancel-
ing the contract, but did not return the payments received. The
vendors then brought an action to quiet title which the district
court granted, but which the supreme court reversed.' 4 The
supreme court said: "We conclude that the Sadlers' [vendors]
retention of the installment payments, after learning that Ballan-
tyne [vendee] had not paid the delinquent real estate taxes, was
inconsistent with an intent to cancel the January 16, 1972, con-
tract for deed and constituted a waiver of the right to cancel such
contract under Chapter 32-18."'
If a vendor elects to proceed under this chapter, he or she is
not barred from bringing an action for cancellation before the
time for redemption specified in the notice of cancellation has
8. N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-18-01 (1976 & Supp. 1991).
9. Sadler v. Ballantyne, 268 N.W.2d 119, 122 (N.D. 1978) (citation omitted).
10. 268 N.W.2d 119 (N.D. 1978).
11. Sadler v. Ballantyne, 268 N.W.2d 119, 121 (N.D. 1978).
12. Id.
13. Id. at 122.
14. Id. at 125.
15. Id. For a case in which the court reached a different result, see Pyle v. Egeberg,
356 N.W.2d 94 (N.D. 1984).
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expired. In Johnson v. Gray,16 after the vendees had defaulted,
the vendors gave the statutory notice, but thereafter brought an
action in the district court. The lower court, applying the doctrine
of election of remedies, dismissed the action. The supreme court
reversed, noting that the vendees had suffered no detriment from
the vendor's choosing to proceed by an action to cancel. 17 The
court wrote, "as the sellers commenced the action herein prior [to
the elapse of the statutory time], it is our view that they are not
precluded from bringing the action."'"
B. SECTION 32-18-02--DEFAULT-CONTENTS OF NOTICE.
This section specifically requires that:
1. the vendor act within a reasonable time after default;
2. the notice be in writing;
3. it be served upon the vendee or assignee;
4. the notice state that the default has occurred;
5. the contract will be canceled; and
6. the time the cancellation will be effective, as pro-
vided in section 32-18-04 of the North Dakota Cen-
tury Code.' 9
A reasonable time within which the vendor must act depends
upon the circumstances of each case.20
The notice required under this section must contain three ele-
ments: 1) a statement that a default has occurred; 2) notification
that the contract will be canceled; and 3) a date upon which the
termination shall take effect. If any one of these is missing, the
notice is defective. For example, in Williamson v. Magnusson,2 1
the notice failed to state the time when the cancellation would be
effective.22 The supreme court said the notice failed to comply
with the statute.23 However, a notice which contains the essential
elements, but erroneously claims a default in payment of taxes and
interest, is still valid even if it also accelerates the balance due on
16. 251 N.W.2d 923 (N.D. 1977).
17. Johnson v. Gray, 251 N.W.2d 923, 926 (N.D. 1977).
18. Id.
19. N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-18-02 (1976 & Supp. 1991).
20. In Duffy v. Egeland, 143 N.W. 350, 352 (N.D. 1913), evidence indicated that the
parties were in communication with each other during the period of default. Based upon
this evidence, the court concluded that "it would be preposterous to hold that as a matter of
law he [the vendor] had waived his right to cancel." Id.
21. 336 N.W.2d 353 (N.D. 1983).
22. Williamson v. Magnusson, 336 N.W.2d 353, 355 (N.D. 1983).
23. Id.
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the purchase price.24
With regard to acceleration, a vendor who cancels a land con-
tract by statutory notice cannot demand payment of the balance
remaining due on the contract even if it contains an acceleration
clause. In discussing acceleration, the supreme court pointed out
that section 32-18-04 of the North Dakota Century Code allows a
defaulting vendee a certain amount of time "'to perform the con-
ditions or comply with the provisions upon which the default shall
have occurred.'"-25 "We do not believe," the court wrote, "that
the Legislature intended, by the use of this language, to allow a
seller to make payment of an accelerated balance one of the condi-
tions with which the buyer must comply in order to reinstate the
contract and to prevent forfeiture of his equitable interests in the
property under this statute. 26
C. SECTION 32-18-03-NOTICE OF DEFAULT-HOW
SERVED.
This section requires notice to be served "in the manner pro-
vided for the service of a summons in the district court .... 27
This means that notice must be served in accordance with Rules
4(d) through (k) of the Rules of Civil Procedure. 8 If the vendee is
not a resident of North Dakota or "cannot be found therein," the
notice may be served by publication "once each week for three
successive weeks." 29
D. SECTION 32-18-04-TIME ALLOWED TO CORRECT
DEFAULTS.
This section grants a defaulting vendee either a six-month or
one-year period of redemption "to perform the conditions or com-
ply with the provisions upon which the default shall have occurred
"30
The pertinent provisions of the statute are:
1) If the amount claimed due under such instrument at
the date of the notice is more than sixty-six and two-
24. Johnson v. Gray, 265 N.W.2d 861, 865 (N.D. 1978).
25. Id. at 863 (quoting N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-18-04 (1976 & Supp. 1991)).
26. Id.
27. N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-18-03 (1976).
28. N.D. R. Civ. P. 4(d)-k).
29. N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-18-03 (1976).
30. N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-18-04 (1976 & Supp. 1991).
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thirds percent of the original indebtedness, the time
allowed to correct the default shall be six months.
2) In any other case, the time for correction shall be one
year.3 '
After setting forth the effect of the vendee's performance or
nonperformance, and noting that a contract cannot "obviate the
necessity of giving the aforesaid notice,"'32 the section concludes
with the following statement: "The time allowed to correct the
default shall not be less than one year except in contracts involv-
ing an area not to exceed three acres."33
The "amount claimed due" in the statute is synonymous with
the amount of the "default" which the vendee must cure. This is
because the vendor cannot demand payment of the balance due
on the purchase price, and the vendees "must be allowed to cure
or correct their defaults in the manner specified by the statute.
34
In most cases, the "amount claimed due" will be one or two install-
ments, and/or nonpayment of taxes, and therefore will usually be
substantially less than "sixty-six and two-thirds of the original
indebtedness. '35 This, therefore, will bring into play item two of
the statute, giving the vendee one year to redeem.36
It is doubtful that this was the intention of the Legislature.
One can surmise that the Legislature intended to give only a six-
month period of redemption when the amount remaining due on
the contract, rather than the amount in default, "is more than
sixty-six and two-thirds percent of the original indebtedness."3 7 In
such cases, the vendor's interest in the contract would be substan-
tially greater than the vendee's; thus, the time to cure the default
should be less.
E. SECTION 32-18-05--NOTICE OF CANCELLATION TO BE
RECORDED
In order to complete cancellation under this chapter, the ven-
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. (emphasis added).
34. Johnson v. Gray, 265 N.W.2d 861, 863 (N.D. 1978).
35. N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-18-04 (1976 & Supp. 1991). In Johnson v. Gray, 265 N.W.2d
861 (N.D. 1978), the "original indebtedness" was $47,000 and the default was only the first
installment of $2,000. Id. at 865. The vendor's notice gave the vendees one year to
redeem. Id. at 862. In Sadler v. Ballantyne, 268 N.W.2d 119 (N.D. 1978), the "original
indebtedness" was $326,500 and the default was $11,754. Id. at 120. The vendors gave one
year to cure the default. Id. at 121.
36. N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-18-04 (1976 & Supp. 1991).
37. Id.
51919931
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dor must record: 1) the notice of cancellation; 2) an affidavit of
service upon the vendee or assignee; and 3) an affidavit that the
default has not been cured within the time for redemption a.3  This
presumably clears title for the vendor, although no title standard
expressly states this.
F. SECTION 32-18-06-COUNTERCLAIM-INJUNCTION
AGAINST CANCELING CONTRACT.
A defaulting vendee who believes that he or she has "a legal
counterclaim or any other valid defense," may secure relief by fil-
ing an affidavit with the district court.39 If the court is satisfied
that such a defense exists, the judge may order all further proceed-
ings be held in the district court.40 Notice of the defense or coun-
terclaim must be given to the vendor or his or her attorney.4 1
Presumably, this must be done by the vendee or his or her attor-
ney. The vendor may appeal the district court's order.42
III. CANCELLATION OF LAND CONTRACTS BY ACTION
As noted earlier, cancellation of land contracts under chapter
32-18 of the North Dakota Century Code is not an exclusive rem-
edy. Therefore, a vendor may proceed to cancel by an action in
the district court. In such cases, no notice other than commence-
ment of the action needs to be given to the defaulting vendee.4 3
An action to cancel a land contract is an equitable one, and
therefore equitable principles apply.44 There is no right to a jury
even though a party has raised " 'legal defenses.' ,,4' Further, the
court has said that "[w]here a trial court exercises its discretion
after weighing the equities of the case, we will not interfere unless
an abuse of discretion is affirmatively established. 4
A vendor seeking cancellation of a contract is not entitled to
recover the purchase price47 or money damages. In reference to
38. N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-18-05 (1976).
39. N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-18-06 (1976).
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Board of Univ. and Sch. Lands v. Vance, 122 N.W.2d 200, 202 (N.D. 1963).
43. Schumacher Homes, Inc. v. J. & W. Enterprises, 318 N.W.2d 763, 765 (N.D. 1982);
Adolph Rub Trust v. Rub, 474 N.W.2d 73, 76 (N.D. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S.Ct. 1276
(1992), reh'g denied, 112 S.Ct. 1713 (1992).
44. Funderberg v. Young, 281 N.W. 87, 89 (N.D. 1938); Adolph Rub Trust, 474 N.W.2d
at 75.
45. Adolph Rub Trust, 474 N.W.2d at 75.
46. Shervold v. Schmidt, 359 N.W.2d 361, 363 (N.D. 1984) (citations omitted).
47. Vail v. Evesmith, 241 N.W. 719, 721 (N.D. 1932); Zent v. Zent, 281 N.W.2d 41, 46
n.1 (N.D. 1979); Langenes v. Bullinger, 328 N.W.2d 241, 246 (N.D. 1982).
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disallowing money damages, Justice Paul M. Sand wrote: "[W]e
believe the award of the money judgment in addition to the other
remedies provided by the judgment would permit the Langeneses
[vendors] to accomplish indirectly what they could not accomplish
directly through an action pursuant to the cancellation statutes or
foreclosure statutes." 48
A. ACCELERATION
A vendor choosing to cancel a contract by notice under chap-
ter 32-18 of the North Dakota Century Code cannot accelerate the
payments due, even if the contract contains an acceleration clause.
However, this is not true when the vendor seeks to cancel by
action. In Jesz v. Geigle,49 the supreme court affirmed the lower
court's acceleration and cancellation of the contract because it
could find no evidence that doing so would be inequitable.50 The
court, however, expressly left open the question whether courts
may disregard an acceleration clause when it would be equitable
to do so. "We need not reach that issue because of the equities in
this case."'31 Because the equities were on the vendor's side, accel-
eration was approved.
When the equities are in favor of the vendee, however, equi-
table principles may prevent the application of the acceleration
clause. That was the situation in Shervold v. Schmidt,52 in which
the default clause stated that "time was of the essence."53 The
vendor, however, had accepted both early and late payments,
including payments made after the vendor had demanded the
total amount due on the contract.5 4 In affirming the district
court's refusal to grant cancellation, the supreme court stated:
"We conclude that, in light of the equities presented, the trial
court was correct in its determination that the Shervolds' [ven-
dors'] actions in accepting late payments were inconsistent with
the terms of the contract and that it would be inequitable to
48. Langenes, 328 N.W.2d at 246.
49. 319 N.W.2d 481 (N.D. 1982).
50. Jesz v. Geigle, 319 N.W.2d 481, 482 (N.D. 1982). A headnote in Jesz v. Geigle
misrepresents that both in actions at law and in equity, provisions making time of the
essence are "binding." Headnote 2 reads: "Where parties to the contract for deed
expressly make time of the essence, such a provision is binding not only in law but also in
equity." That headnote, however, somewhat overstates what the court actually did in the
Jesz case.
51. Id. at 483.
52. 359 N.W.2d 361 (N.D. 1984).
53. Shervold v. Schmidt, 359 N.W.2d 361, 364 (N.D. 1984).
54. Id.
19931
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declare a cancellation of the contract for deed. ' 55 In distinguish-
ing Shervold from Jesz, the court concluded that in Shervold, the
vendors in effect indicated by their actions that time really was not
of the essence.56
If a vendor intends to accelerate the remaining payments due,
he or she should so state in the complaint. If failure to do so mis-
leads or prejudices the vendee, the court may, in its discretion,
prohibit acceleration.5 7
B. REDEMPTION
There is no statutory period of redemption applicable to
actions to cancel a land contract. According to the supreme court,
"the trial court is left to its discretion in the matter."5 8 Even if the
district court does not set a time by which a vendee may redeem,
that decision will be upheld if the equities so dictate. 9
IV. FORECLOSURE
In discussing the choice of remedies available to a vendor,
North Dakota Supreme Court Justice A. M. Christianson wrote
more than sixty years ago:
Upon defendants [vendees] making default, the plaintiff
[vendor] had a choice of remedies. He might have can-
celed the contract by statutory proceedings; he might
have maintained an action to cancel the contract; or he
might have foreclosed the contract by action and
obtained a judgment against the defendants for the
amount due upon the purchase price, and had . . . the
defendant's interest in the land sold at judicial sale and
the proceeds applied upon the judgment6 0
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Straub v. Lessman, 403 N.W.2d 5, 7 (N.D. 1987) (citation omitted).
58. Bender v. Liebelt, 303 N.W.2d 316, 318-19 (N.D. 1981).
59. Id. The court has approved the following redemption periods: Schumacher
Homes, Inc. v. J & W Enterprises, 319 N.W.2d 763, 765 (N.D. 1982) (allowing 90 days); Jesz
v. Geigle, 319 N.W.2d 481, 481 (N.D. 1982) (allowing one year); Shervold v. Schmidt, 359
N.W.2d 361, 362 (N.D. 1984) (allowing 30 days); Striegel v. Dakota Hills, Inc., 365 N.W.2d
491,493,497 (N.D. 1985) (allowing 30 days); Adolph Rub Trust v. Rub, 474 N.W.2d 73 (N.D.
1991), cert. denied, 112 S.Ct. 1276 (1992), reh'g denied, 112 S.Ct. 1713 (1992) (allowing 30
days); Straub v. Lessman, 403 N.W.2d 5, 6-7 (N.D. 1987) (allowing two months).
60. Vail v. Evesmith, 241 N.W. 719, 721 (N.D. 1932) (citations omitted). See also Yon v.
Great Western Dev. Corp., 340 N.W.2d 43, 47 (N.D. 1983) (examining remedies of specific
performance and foreclosure).
In Ryan v. Bremseth, 186 N.W. 818 (N.D. 1922), the supreme court used the words
"cancel" and "canceling" synonymously with "foreclose" and "foreclosure." These words,
of course, refer to separate and distinct causes of action. Ryan was an action to cancel a
522 [Vol. 69:515
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In a foreclosure action, "the vendee does not acquire title to the
property but retains a right of redemption and an advantageous
position during the redemption period."' 6 ' The period of redemp-
tion is one year as set forth in North Dakota Century Code section
32-19-06.62 Should the proceeds of the foreclosure sale leave a
deficiency, the vendor may be able to recover that amount by a
separate action under sections 39-19-06 to -07 of the North Dakota
Century Code, relating to deficiency judgment sales.63
Even if the land contract waives any rights the vendee has
under sections 32-19 of the North Dakota Century Code, that
waiver is invalid. "We therefore conclude..., "a majority of the
court has said, "that, because of the public policy against defi-
ciency judgments, the procedural rights granted mortgagors and
vendees under the anti-deficiency judgment law cannot be con-
tractually waived in advance of default."' The same is not true,
however, if "a mortgagor or vendee who, after default, deter-
mines that his or her position in a controversy can be improved by
waiving certain procedural rights and benefits granted by the anti-
deficiency judgment law[,] [he or she] should not be precluded
from contractually waiving those rights.16 5
Justice Gerald W. VandeWalle disagreed: "I am unconvinced
that under the statutory scheme permitting deficiency judgments
we should recognize any waiver."166 In this case, however, the
majority held that "the agreement [between the parties] does not
contain a clear, unequivocal, and unambiguous waiver of any of
those procedural rights or defenses under the anti-deficiency judg-
ment statutes.
67
contract, not to foreclose it, as the court noted in Vail v. Evesmith, 241 N.W. 719, 721 (N.D.
1932).
61. Yon, 340 N.W.2d at 47. As pointed out supra note 59, the court has approved
various periods of redemption in actions to cancel a land contract. Apparently, the
supreme court has concluded that the one year period set forth in section 32-19-06 of the
North Dakota Century Code does not apply in such cases. The reasoning behind this may
be that the court believes this section applies only when the premises has been sold in a
foreclosure sale. Furthermore, the court has not held that all sections of chapter 32-19 of
the North Dakota Century Code apply to actions to cancel. For example, in Schaff v.
Kennelly, 61 N.W.2d 538 (1953), the court held that neither the notice requirements of
what is now section 32-19-20 of the Century Code, nor the requirement of a power of
attorney under what is now section 32-19-02 of the Century Code apply to foreclosure of
land contracts.
62. N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-19-06 (1976 & Supp. 1991).
63. Yon, 340 N.W.2d at 47. See also Hagan v. Havnvik, 421 N.W.2d 56, 61 (N.D. 1988)
(stating that a separate action is necessary in order to obtain deficiency judgment).
64. Brunsoman v. Scarlett, 465 N.W.2d 162, 167 (N.D. 1991) (citations omitted).
65. Id. at 168 (emphasis added).
66. Id. at 169 (VandeWalle, J., concurring).
67. Id.
1993] 523
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
V. SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE
Specific performance of a land contract is available to either
vendor or vendee, although vendors have not had much success
with this remedy. A person seeking specific performance "is held
to a higher standard than if he [or she] merely asks for money
damages for breach of the contract."'6 8
A. SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE FOR THE VENDOR
A vendor requesting specific performance must overcome
several obstacles. The first is section 32-04-09 of the North Dakota
Century Code, which creates a presumption in favor of a vendee
that a failure to "transfer real property cannot be relieved ade-
quately by pecuniary compensation.""9 Second, inJonmil, Inc. v.
McMerty,7 ° the court said that section 32-04-09 "does not support
an action by seller for specific performance."' 7 1 The court, how-
ever, has refused to hold "that specific performance at any time or
under any conditions will not be available to the vendor, ' 72 but
has pointed out that "whether or not specific performance of a
contract for deed is available to the seller is not without its
problems and difficulties in North Dakota."7
3
One of the problems which the court sees is the application of
the deficiency judgment statues74 to actions for specific perform-
ance. In McKee v. Kinev,75 heirs of a vendor sued "for a personal
money judgment ... to collect the balance due and owing on the
contract, together with interest and costs."' 76 Although the court
did not treat the case as one for specific performance, the parties
stipulated that "'the plaintiffs are ready, willing and able to make
conveyance of the legal title.., and have tendered and offered to
make such conveyance upon payment by the defendant of the bal-
ance due under said contract.' 77 The court considered the case
simply as one for a money judgment, and therefore, the deficiency
judgment statutes required dismissal of the complaint.78
68. Sand v. Red River Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 224 N.W.2d 375, 378 (N.D. 1974).
69. N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-04-09 (1976 & Supp. 1991).
70. 265 N.W.2d 257 (N.D. 1978).
71. Jonmil, Inc. v. McMerty, 265 N.W.2d 257, 259 (N.D. 1978) (emphasis added). See
also Wolf v. Anderson, 334 N.W.2d 212, 215 (N.D. 1983).
72. Jonmil, Inc., 265 N.W.2d at 260.
73. Id.
74. N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-19-06 to -07 (1976 & Supp. 1991).
75. 160 N.W.2d 97 (N.D. 1968).
76. McKee v. Kinev, 160 N.W.2d 97, 98 (N.D. 1968).
77. Id. at 99.
78. Id. at 100-101.
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Jonmil, Inc. v. McMerty7 9 was another case in which the North
Dakota Supreme Court affirmed a trial court decision denying spe-
cific performance to a vendor.8 0 The supreme court concluded
that "technically Jonmil, Inc., [the vendor] did not request specific
performance of the basic contract, but sought relief under part of
the default provisions ..8.1.", The court then held that because
the vendor "elected to proceed under the default provision, even
though denominated specific performance and argued as such, [it]
is bound by its election."8s2
The court, however, confused the issue by discussing the
application of the deficiency judgment statute in connection with
actions for specific performance. The court raised this hypotheti-
cal: "[L]et us assume the seller on a contract for deed seeks spe-
cific performance from the purchaser and the court grants it, but
the purchaser is unable to pay the money."8 3 In such a case, the
court noted that "[tihe seller, in the absence of a separate note,
would have no recourse other than the cancellation of the contract
for deed. If the seller were to seek a money judgment, [sections]
32-19-06 and 32-19-07 [of the North Dakota Century Code],
prohibiting deficiency judgments, would have to be considered." 4
The court, of course, is correct, but it is not the vendor's seeking
specific performance that triggers the deficiency judgments stat-
utes; seeking a "money judgment" is the catalyst.
The cloud of the deficiency judgment statute hovered over
the court again in Wolf v. Anderson'- and Williamson v. Magnus-
son.8 6 In both cases, the court bypassed questions relating to the
application of these statutes to specific performance actions.8 7 In
denying specific relief to a vendor in Wolf, however, the court
wrote: "We do not hold that there is no case in which a vendor
can obtain specific performance of a contract for the sale of real
property." 8
A vendor should be able to obtain specific performance of a
land contract against a vendee when damages for nonperformance
79. 265 N.W.2d 257 (N.D. 1978).
80. Jonmil, Inc. v. McMerty, 265 N.W.2d 257, 261 (N.D. 1978).
81. Id. at 260.
82. Id. at 261.
83. Id. at 260.
84. Id.
85. 334 N.W.2d 212 (N.D. 1983).
86. 336 N.W.2d 353 (N.D. 1983).
87. See Wolf v. Anderson, 334 N.W.2d 212, 214 n.2 (N.D. 1983); Williamson v.
Magnusson, 336 N.W.2d 353, 356 n.1 (N.D. 1983).
88. Wolf, 334 N.W.2d at 216.
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would be inadequate.8 9 "[T]he judgment in most cases will consist
of the amount of money remaining due the vendor under the
terms of the contract. In return, the vendee acquires title to the
property."90
In such a situation, the deficiency statutes should have no
application for several reasons:
1) Sections 32-19-06 to -07 of the North Dakota Century
Code specifically apply only to "the cancellation or
the foreclosure of a land contract" which contemplate
a judicial sale of the property;91
2) a specific performance judgment will order the ven-
dee to perform, i.e., pay the balance of the purchase
price, but that is not a deficiency which results from a
judicial sale wherein the money received was less
than the balance due on the contract; and
3) the court has pointed out that there is substantial dif-
ference between foreclosure and specific perform-
ance actions.92
As Justice Vande Walle wrote for the court, "absent from a pro-
ceeding in which specific performance is sought is a jury determi-
nation of the value of the land. Ordinarily, the granting of specific
performance will result in a judgment for the amount remaining
due under the terms of the contract even if the agreement calls for
the price to be substantially more than the land is worth." 93
Assuming that a vendor does have a right to specific perform-
ance, he or she "has the burden of proving he [or she] is entitled to
it" and that "the legal remedy of damages is inadequate."94 The
vendor's failure to prove the inadequacy of monetary damages
caused the supreme court to reverse a grant of specific perform-
ance in Williamson v. Magnusson.9 5
B. SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE FOR THE VENDEE
Specific performance in favor of the vendee has been granted
in a number of cases96 and denied in others.97 Even if a vendor is
89. Williamson, 336 N.W.2d at 356 (reversing trial court's ruling because there was no
explanation of why money damages were inadequate).
90. Yon, 340 N.W.2d 43, 46 (N.D. 1983) (citation omitted).
91. N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-19-06 (1976 & Supp. 1991).
92. Yon, 340 N.W.2d at 46.
93. Id. at 47.
94. Wolf, 334 N.W.2d at 215 (citations omitted).
95. 336 N.W.2d 353, 356 (N.D. 1983).
96. Pederson v. Dibble, 98 N.W. 411 (N.D. 1904); Beddow v. Flage, 132 N.W 637 (N.D.
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unable to convey all of the property that was contracted for, the
vendee is entitled to a conveyance of any property over which the
vendor has control and an abatement of the purchase price.98
In Beddow v. Flage,9 the court stated that even though the
land contract was signed only by the vendor, it was still subject to
specific performance by the vendee if the vendee "has performed
or offers to perform it . . . and the case is otherwise proper for
enforcing specific performance '."' The court also approved pay-
ment of damages to the vendee because the vendor withheld pos-
session and delayed conveying the property.' 0' Finally, in two
cases in which vendees were denied specific performance, the trial
court found "over-reaching, .... unfairness," and "sharp practices"
on their part.'0 2
VI. ACTIONS TO QUIET TITLE
With regard to the use of quiet title actions to cancel land con-
tracts, Justice Alvin C. Strutz wrote for the North Dakota Supreme
Court: "The right to terminate a vendee's rights under a land con-
tract by an action to quiet title has long been recognized by our
courts."'10 3 In such actions, the trial court is to be guided by equi-
table principles. 10 4
VII. RECISSION
Chapter 9-09 of the North Dakota Century Code provides a
unilateral method of rescinding contracts, 105 including land
1911); Gunsch v. Gunsch, 71 N.W.2d 623 (N.D. 1955); Rohrich v. Kaplan, 248 N.W.2d 801
(N.D. 1976); Green v. Gustafson, 482 N.W.2d 842 (N.D. 1992); Orfield v. Harney, 157 N.W.
124 (N.D. 1916).
97. Sand v. Red River Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 224 N.W.2d 375 (N.D. 1974); Knudtson
v. Robinson, 118 N.W. 1051 (N.D. 1908); Zimmerman v. Campbell, 245 N.W.2d 469 (N.D.
1976).
98. Gunsch v. Gunsch, 71 N.W.2d 623, 630 (N.D. 1955) (affirming the trial court's
award of abatement when vendor could convey only one-half of the minerals); Green v.
Gustafson, 482 N.W.2d 842, 846 (N.D. 1992) (ordering conveyence of property and
abatement when the vendor owned only 2/3 of the property).
99. 132 N.W. 637 (N.D. 1911).
100. Beddow v. Flagg, 132 N.W. 637, 639 (N.D. 1911) (citations omitted).
101. Id. at 640.
102. Sand, 224 N.W.2d at 379 (holding that the trial court's finding of overreaching not
clearly erroneous); Zimmerman, 245 N.W.2d at 471 (finding that facts indicating
"unfairness, artifice, sharp practice, [and] overreaching" allow the equity court to apply
them in its discretion).
103. Knauss v. Miles Homes, Inc., 173 N.W.2d 896, 901 (N.D. 1969) (citations omitted).
104. Id.
105. N.D. CENT. CODE ch. 9-09 (1987 & Supp. 1991); Omlid v. Sweeney, 484 N.W.2d
486, 489 (N.D. 1992).
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contracts. lO6
This unilateral rescission may be enforced by adjudication. 10 7
However, a person seeking rescission must have complied with
section 9-09-04 of the North Dakota Century Code by acting
promptly in seeking rescission and offering to "restore to the other
party anything of value."' 08 By not doing both, a person may have
waived his or her right to rescind. 10 9 Furthermore, the court has
held that when a vendee seeks to rescind a land contract, he or she
cannot "demand that the Seller[s] pay damages, including loss of
anticipated profits, as a prerequisite to return of the premises.""10
Rescission under chapter 9-09 of the North Dakota Century Code
"completely abrogates the contract from the beginning.""'
A party may also "bring an action in equity setting forth his
election to rescind and ask the court to declare a termination of
the contract.""' 2 In choosing to proceed in equity, however, one
must understand that a "'party is not entitled to equitable relief if
there is a remedy provided by law which is equally adjusted to
rendering complete justice.' """
As pointed out in Heinsohn v. William Clarmont, Inc.,x14
rescission, "whether the object of a suit in equity or an action at
law, is governed by equitable principles."'"15 These equitable prin-
ciples include compliance with section 9-09-04 of the North
Dakota Century Code, which requires that the party act promptly
and restore everything of value to the other party.1 16
106. Schaff v. Kennelly, 61 N.W.2d 538, 546 (N.D. 1953) (discussing contracts to
purchase real estate).
107. Id. at 546. See also Omlid, 484 N.W.2d at 490; N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-04-21 (1976
& Supp. 1991).
108. Holcomb v. Zinke, 365 N.W.2d 507, 510 (N.D. 1985); West v. Carlson, 454 N.W.2d
307, 309 (N.D. 1990) (requiring restoration of everything of value). See also Borsheim v. 0
& J Properties, 481 N.W.2d 590, 594 n.7 (N.D. 1992) (discussing the necessity of offering to
restore or for restoration before commencement of the action).
109. Berg v. Hogan, 322 N.W.2d 448 (N.D. 1982) (finding that the failure to ascertain
facts and to act promptly to discover legal rights may constitute a right to rescind waiver).
See also Holcomb, 365 N.W.2d at 510 (stating that "[a] party failing to promptly exercise the
right of rescission.., waives that right" (emphasis added)); West, 454 N.W.2d at 309; Mader
v. Hintz, 186 N.W.2d 897, 901 (N.D. 1971); Fedorenko v. Rudman, 71 N.W.2d 332, 338
(N.D. 1955).
110. Alton's, Inc. v. Long, 352 N.W.2d 198, 200 (N.D. 1984). See also Blair v. Boulger,
358 N.W.2d 522, 523 (N.D. 1984), cert denied, 471 U.S. 1095 (1985).
111. Schaff v. Kennelly, 61 N.W.2d 538, 547 (N.D. 1953).
112. Id. at 546. See also Omlid v. Sweeney, 484 N.W.2d 486, 490 (N.D. 1992).
113. Omlid, 484 N.W.2d at 490 (citations omitted). See also In re Estate of Hill, 492
N.W.2d 288, 295 n.3 (N.D. 1992).
114. 364 N.W.2d 511 (N.D. 1985).
115. Heinsohn v. William Clarmont, Inc., 364 N.W.2d 511, 513 (N.D. 1985) (citations
omitted). See also Omlid, 484 N.W.2d at 490; Borsheim v. 0 & J Properties, 481 N.W.2d
590, 594 (N.D. 1992).
116. Omlid, 484 N.W.2d at 489 n.2.
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Although rescission is permitted in both law and equity it is
"not held in high esteem by the courts." '117
VIII. MONETARY RELIEF
A. CANCELLATION ACTIONS
One of the general rules applicable in cancellation of land
contract cases is
that a party may not take contradictory positions, and
where he has a right to choose one of two modes of
redress, and the two are so inconsistent that the assertion
of one involves the negation or repudiation of the other,
his deliberate and settled choice of one with knowledge
or the means of knowledge of such facts as would author-
ize a resort to each will preclude him thereafter from
going back and electing again.""
This rule was applied when a vendor canceled a land contract by
notice and thereafter asserted a counterclaim for the unpaid
purchase price.' 9 These remedies, the court found, are inconsis-
tent, and the vendor, having made his choice, is foreclosed from
asserting the other.120
B. SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE ACTIONS
A vendor may choose not to cancel the contract but to sue for
the purchase price instead. This may be done by an action for spe-
cific performance. In such a case, "the granting of specific per-
formance will result in a judgment for the amount remaining due
under the terms of the contract even if the agreement calls for the
price to be substantially more than the land is worth.' 12 1
In Schwarting v. Schwarting,12 2 the court upheld a district
court judgment granting specific performance to the vendee. 1 3
During the time this judgment was on appeal, the vendee
remained in possession of the land. Shortly after the affirmance of
the judgment by the supreme court, the vendors leased the land to
117. Heinsohn, 364 N.W.2d at 513.
118. Roney v. H. S. Halvorsen Co., 149 N.W. 688, 690 (N.D. 1914) (citations omitted).
119. Id. at 689.
120. Id. (finding that "[t]he defendants had clearly elected to cancel .... Such being
the case, it is clear that the defendants could not sue for the unpaid balance...").
121. Yon v. Great Western Dev. Corp., 340 N.W.2d 43, 47 (N.D. 1983). As pointed out
in the text accompanying notes 68-95, vendors have not been very successful with this
remedy.
122. 354 N.W.2d 706 (N.D. 1984).
123. Schwarting v. Schwarting, 354 N.W.2d 706, 709 (N.D. 1984).
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the vendee. While the appeal in the first case was pending, the
vendors brought an action against the vendee for rent plus pay-
ment of taxes which the vendors had paid. 124 The district court
refused to order payment of rent, but did give judgment against
the vendee for interest on the contract until the date the deed was
given, plus the taxes. The supreme court affirmed, with two jus-
tices dissenting.125 Believing that the equities favored the ven-
dors, the majority adopted a rule that "a purchaser should not be
able to enjoy the use and profits of the land as well as the balance
due on the purchase price without paying interest on the bal-
ance. '"126 The dissenters, however, believed that the equities in
this case were with the vendee.
C. FORECLOSURE ACTIONS
A vendor may secure monetary relief by foreclosing the con-
tract under chapter 32-19 of the North Dakota Century Code. In
such an action, "the vendor seeks a judgment declaring the
amount due on the contract and an order of sale of the property to
satisfy the judgment."' 27 Should the money received from the sale
be insufficient to satisfy the balance due, a vendor may bring a
separate action to recover the deficiency under sections 32-19-06
to -07 of the North Dakota Century Code.'8 The case of
Langenes v. Bullinger129 is another illustration of the application
of the election of remedies rule. The vendors sued
for the balance due on the contract for deed plus interest,
and in the event the Bullingers [vendees] did not pay the
balance due, then the Langeneses [vendors] sought a
judgment terminating the contract for deed and the pos-
session of the Bullingers. Alternatively, the Langeneses
sought to obtain possession of the property and reserved
their right to obtain a deficiency judgment against the
Bullingers. 130
The trial court awarded the vendors a money judgment in the
amount of $21,591.44 for payments due on the contract plus inter-
124. Id.
125. Id. at 710-11.
126. Id. at 709 (citations omitted).
127. Yon v. Great Western Dev. Corp., 340 N.W.2d 43, 47 (N.D. 1983) (citations
omitted).
128. Id.
129. 328 N.W.2d 241 (N.D. 1982). Although the West Reporter syllabus characterizes
this as a foreclosure action, that characterization is questionable.
130. Langenes v. Bullinger, 328 N.W.2d 241, 242-43 (N.D. 1982).
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est.' 3' The judgment stated that if the vendees paid the judg-
ment, the contract would be still in effect, but also provided that
"[i]f there is a cancellation of the land contract as provided herein,
the money judgment is not extinguished."132
In reversing the judgment, the supreme court reiterated the
general rule "that a vendor in an action to cancel a contract for
deed cannot recover a personal money judgment and also cancel
the contract for deed.' 33
D. QUIET TITLE ACTIONS
A vendor seeking to cancel a contract by a quiet title action
may secure monetary relief as well, however, "the value of any
equity which [the vendee] had must, of course, be credited on his
personal liability.' '1 34
E. RESCISSION ACTIONS
In Skinner v. Scholes,13 5 the court wrote:
The object sought by the judgment in such a case [rescis-
sion of a land contract] is to place the parties as nearly as
possible in statu[s] quo. In that behalf the general rule is
that interest on the purchase money paid and the use of
the land under the contract, where the purchaser is in
possession, shall offset each other.' 36
However, if the rescinding vendee has made improvements upon
the land, he or she may be able to recover or offset the costs
thereof.'37
A party who believes that he or she has grounds to rescind a
contract, of course, need not resort to that course of action. For
example, the court has said that "[a] person who has been fraudu-
lently induced to enter into a contract may either rescind the con-
tract, or retain the benefits of the contract and obtain damages for
injuries from the fraud.' ' 38
131. Id. at 242.
132. Id. at 243 (emphasis in original).
133. Id. at 246.
134. Fyten v. Cummins,-203 N.W. 178, 182 (N.D. 1925).
135. 229 N.W. 114 (N.D. 1930).
136. Skinner v. Scholes, 229 N.W. 114, 117 (N.D. 1930) (citations omitted). See also
Funk v. Baird, 6 N.W.2d 569, 575 (N.D. 1942). The court held that the vendees were not
tenants and therefore could not be charged rent. However, they were responsible for the
value of the use of the land.
137. Skinner, 229 N.W. at 117.
138. West v. Carlson, 454 N.W.2d 307, 309 (N.D. 1990) (citations omitted).
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IX. SUMMARY
A. CHAPTER 32-18-CANCELLATION BY NOTICE
A vendor choosing to cancel by giving notice under this chap-
ter must strictly follow the statutory requirements. The vendor
must demand only the amounts in default, and cannot accelerate
the balance due on the contract. Service of the notice must be in
accordance with Rule 4 of the North Dakota Rules of Civil
Procedure. 39
There is some question as to when the six-month redemption
period set forth in section 32-18-04 of the North Dakota Century
Code applies. It appears that in almost all cases, the notice must
give the vendee one year in which to correct the default. Cancel-
lation is complete with the filing of the papers required under sec-
tion 32-18-05 of the North Dakota Century Code.
A defaulting vendee who believes he or she has a defense to
the cancellation may seek relief from the district court. If the
court believes the defense is valid it may order all further proceed-
ings to be had in court.
B. CANCELLATION BY ACTION
Cancellation by notice is not an exclusive remedy, and there-
fore an action to cancel a land contract may be brought in the dis-
trict court. No notice other than commencement of the action is
necessary. Neither the purchase price nor monetary damages is
available. A vendor can, however, accelerate the balance due if
the contract contains an acceleration clause, and if the equities are
on his or her side. The redemption period is within the discretion
of the trial court.
C. FORECLOSURE
Land contracts may be foreclosed under chapter 32-19 of the
North Dakota Century Code, but the vendor must bring another
action in order to obtain a deficiency judgment under sections 32-
19-06 to -07. A vendee cannot, by contract, waive any rights he or
she may have under these sections. However, he or she may
waive such rights after default if it would be beneficial to do so.
139. For a discussion of service by certified mail under Rule 4(dX2XAXiv), see Farm
Credit Bank v. Huether, 454 N.W.2d 710, 712-13 (N.D. 1990).
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D. SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE
For a vendor, the underlying rule is that specific performance
will not be granted if legal damages are adequate. When the ven-
dee fails to perform, there should be no reason why a vendor
should not receive specific performance when damages would
inadequately compensate him or her. The deficiency statutes
should not come into play if the vendor confines his or her request
to payment of the unpaid purchase price.
For a vendee, however, section 32-04-09 of the North Dakota
Century Code creates a presumption that failure to receive the
property contracted for "cannot be relieved adequately by pecu-
niary compensation."
E. ACTIONS TO QUIET TITLE
An action to quiet title is an equitable action and has long
been available as a method of cancellation of land contracts.
F. RESCISSION
Rescission of contracts is not favored by the courts. Neverthe-
less, it is available to either the vendor or the vendee as a method
of canceling a land contract. Chapter 9-09 of the North Dakota
Century Code provides a unilateral method of rescinding a con-
tract. If that method is used, it must be strictly followed. If a party
resorts to legal action to rescind, equitable principles will apply
whether the action is in equity or law.
X. CONCLUSION
The number of actions described herein for cancellation of
land contracts raises questions about the effectiveness of chapter
32-18 of the North Dakota Century Code. For example, it appears
that in almost all cases, a vendor attempting to cancel a land con-
tract by statutory notice must give the vendee a year to cure the
default. However, as pointed out earlier, in actions to cancel land
contracts, trial courts have discretion to give the vendee whatever
period seems equitable and many give no more than thirty days.
Furthermore, a vendor using chapter 32-18 of the North
Dakota Century Code cannot accelerate the balance due on the
contract. However, a court may grant acceleration in an action to
cancel if time is of the essence.
Also, presumably the recording of a notice of cancellation and
affidavits, as required by section 32-18-05 of the North Dakota
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Century Code, is sufficient to confirm title in the vendor. At pres-
ent, however, there is no title standard that confirms this, which
causes some uncertainty.
Faced with these impediments, it is understandable why a
lawyer representing a vendor would prefer to seek cancellation of
a land contract by action instead of by statutory notice.
